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“THE ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION” UNDER ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: IMPACT ON LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Aashit Shah1
I.

INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights2 (“IPRs”) are inherently monopolistic3 as they provide the IPR

owner with certain exclusive rights, thereby preventing third parties from exercising or
exploiting those IPRs for a stipulated time period.4 This characteristic may at the outset seem to
contradict the fundamental premise of competition law that aims to eliminate, or at the very least,
reduce monopolies and cartels in order to facilitate free trade and healthy competition.5 The
increasing importance of intellectual property protection in international trade evinced by the
Preamble6 to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights, 1994
(“TRIPS”)7 and the augmentation of IPR trade have intensified the tug-of-war between IPRs and
competition law.8
The ‘collision’ between IPRs and competition law is also reflected within the European
Union (“EU”).9 The main objective of the EU10 is to abolish inter-state barriers to free movement
of goods11 within the common market. This objective has been emphasized by the European
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in Establissements Consten SA and Grundig-verkaufs GmbH v.
Commission.12 Competition law in the EU ensures a level playing field for businesses in the
member states and prevents the distortion of free trade within the common internal market.
[*42*] The Treaty of the European Community (“EC Treaty”) emphasizes the unrestricted
movement of goods and services and discourages restrictions in competition that have an adverse

impact on trade between member states.13 While a large body of complex law within the EU
dealing with competition issues has developed over the years,14 broadly speaking, EU
competition law is confined to dealing with restrictive agreements and equivalent arrangements
by and between undertakings, mergers that create or strengthen dominant positions, and abuse of
dominant positions by undertakings that have a significant anti-competitive impact on trade
between EU member states.15 Article 81 of the EC Treaty (ex Article 85) outlines provisions that
prevent restrictive agreements or arrangements between undertakings, decisions by associations
of undertakings and concerted practices that have an effect of distorting competition within the
common market. Unlike Article 81, Article 82 (ex Article 86) applies to unilateral actions by
undertakings. Article 82 prohibits “any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it … as incompatible with the
common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.” To put it succinctly in
the words of the ECJ, “for the prohibition under Article 86 [now Article 82] to apply it is ...
necessary that three elements shall be present together: the existence of a dominant position, the
abuse of this position, and the possibility that trade between member-States may be affected
thereby.”16

While the EC Treaty predominantly regulates competition law in the common market, the
individual member states under Article 295 of the EC Treaty regulate IPRs. . Article 295
provides that “the Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member states governing the
system of property ownership.” The ECJ has interpreted the term ‘property’ to include [*43*]
intellectual property17 and therefore Article 295 empowers EU member states to formulate their
own laws to govern the ownership of IPRs.18 IPRs, like other property rights, are subjective

rights relating to an object; a work (for copyright), invention (for patent), trademark etc.19 The
IPR owner has not only the exclusive right to produce and disseminate the work or invention
protected by the IPR, but also has the exclusive right to assign or license the IPR itself to a third
person so that the third person may produce and/or disseminate the work or improve upon it.
Therefore, there is a distinction between the trade in an IPR per se (i.e. copyright or patent right)
and the products resulting from the exercise of such IPRs (such as a book, movie or an invention)
(“IPR products”), which must be borne in mind.20 The main policy rationale underlying
intellectual property protection is to provide the author, owner or inventor an incentive to
innovate. An IPR is granted as a reward for the effort the person or company has put into the
work or invention.21 It gives the owner an advantage compared to other competitors.22 At the
same time, the extent of protection afforded is usually limited in keeping with public interest.
While the IPR owner has certain exclusive rights, the public also has a right to benefit from those
IPRs. This is a delicate balance that needs to be ensured and maintained when granting
intellectual property protection.
The distribution of competition law and intellectual property law between the EU and the
individual member states respectively has raised many problems with the European Community.
The European Commission,23 (“Commission”) the ECJ and its subordinate Court of First
Instance (“CFI”) have played an active role in enforcing EU competition law24 and time and
again dealt with the issue of deciding what impact Community competition law has on the
exercise of IPRs, which are predominantly territorial and national in nature. As previously stated,
the goal of integrating national economies has greatly influenced the decisions of the above
[*44*] three institutions in dealing with the debate between competition policies, and exercise of
and trade in IPRs.

This paper attempts to delineate the restraint on licensing of IPRs per se within the EU
with specific reference to Article 82 of the EC Treaty.25
Part II discusses the judicially carved ‘existence vs. exercise’ doctrine in relation to IPRs
under the which Courts have held that while member states continue to have the prerogative to
create IPRs, owners cannot exercise their IPRs in a manner that will frustrate the objectives of
the common market, such as distort competition thereby affecting trade between member states. I
argue that this has significantly narrowed the scope of Article 295.
The third part of this paper, focuses on how the Courts and Commission, in restraining
the licensing of IPRs, invoked existing principles of competition law under Article 82. Over the
past couple of decades, the Courts and Commission decided cases in which IPR owners have
been accused of abusing their ‘dominant position’ for not licensing their IPRs.26 In these cases,
the Courts and Commission implicitly applied existing principles of Community law such as the
doctrines of primacy, direct effect and essential facilities, as well as competition law to prevent
IPRs from partitioning the common market.27 In the famous Magill case (discussed throughout
this paper), the ECJ articulated the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, which was applied to
determine if an IPR owner has abused its dominant position in refusing to license its IPRs. In the
Magill case, three television stations broadcasting in Ireland and UK refused to license their
copyright on the information contained in their program listings to Magill, an Irish publisher.
Though the stations obtained an injunction in Ireland against Magill from publishing a
comprehensive TV guide that competed with the broadcaster’s guides, they were unsuccessful
before the Commission, CFI and ECJ. The three authorities held that the television stations had
[*45*] abused their dominant position by refusing to license their copyrights in the program
listings to Magill and thereby violated Article 82 and were ordered to compulsorily license their

copyrights to Magill for reasonable royalties. In later decisions, the Court and Commission
further explored the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test in the context of IPRs. In this section, I
discuss the restraining impact that Article 82 (that is used to regulate anti-competitive practices)
has on IPR licensing.
Part IV discusses the implicit inclusion of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine in adjudicating
IPR licensing issues under Article 82, which can be gleaned from an analysis of some of the
cases. I endorse the view that classifying IPRs as ‘essential facilities’ would undermine their
very existence.
I regretfully conclude that the judicially activist approach of the ECJ, in adopting
different techniques to preclude the partitioning of the common market, has significantly
undermined the nature of IPRs, which could consequently result in stifling innovation. Though
the initial hostility towards IPRs has improved over a period of time, the Courts and Commission
still seem to be prejudiced by the inherently monopolistic effect of IPRs,28 which tends to tilt the
scales in favor of competition law.
II.

EXISTENCE VS. EXERCISE: THE SUPREMACY OF EU LAW OVER MEMBER
STATES’ INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
For a long period of time, the Commission, CFI and ECJ have treated IPRs in a step-

motherly fashion. The EU was created with the purpose of forming a common market to enable
goods, services, people and capital to move freely about.29 However, IPRs seemed to be in
opposition to the fundamental principle of a single market as they provided exclusivity to IPR
owners and thereby restricted free trade in IPR-products. The ECJ dealt with this difficult matter
in Establissements Consten SA and Grundig-verkaufs GmbH v. Commission,30 where it drew a
[*46*] distinction between the grant or existence of a national IPR, which was not subject to the
provisions of the EC Treaty, and the exercise of an IPR, which fell within the purview of the EC

Treaty. The ECJ held that Articles 3031 and 295 of the EC Treaty do not oppose every impact of
Community Law on the exercise of industrial property rights.32 In that case, the Commission
issued an injunction preventing the parties from using their national law relating to trademarks to
obstruct parallel imports, without touching the grant of those rights.33 The Court held that this
action of the Commission was compatible with the character of the Community competition
system.34 The court also went on to say that a trademark owner could not abuse its trademark
rights derived under national law to defeat the Community law on restrictive practices.35
The existence vs. exercise doctrine seems to be consistent with the doctrines of primacy
and direct effect. In the landmark case of Costa v. ENEL,36 the ECJ unequivocally asserted the
‘doctrine of primacy’. It held that unlike other international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created
its own legal system and the member states have limited their sovereign rights albeit within
limited fields, and have created a body of law that binds them and their nationals. Therefore,
unilateral actions taken by individual member states cannot supersede the Community legal
system, nor can they be inconsistent with that legal system.37 This ruling has proved to be very
relevant with respect to IPRs.38 Further, in Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen,39 the ECJ articulated the fundamental ‘doctrine of direct effect’ whereby provisions
of the EC Treaty could have direct effect on member states and that individuals could invoke
them before national courts.40 The ECJ declared that “independent of the legislation of member
states community law not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer
on them rights which become part of their legal heritage.”41 The doctrine of direct effect has
been extended to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.42 [*47*]
While the Consten case was related to Article 81, its reasoning has nevertheless been
extrapolated to apply to provisions under Article 82. In Hoffman v. Centrafarm, the Court

recognized the difference between an existence of an IPR and its exercise, which is limited to
certain provisions in the EC Treaty. In that case the Court held that “to the extent to which the
exercise of a trade-mark right is lawful in accordance with the provisions of Article 36 of the
Treaty, such exercise is not contrary to Article 86 of the Treaty on the sole ground that it is an
act of an undertaking occupying a dominant position on the market if the trademark right has not
been used as an instrument for the abuse of such a position.”43 Even in Volvo v. Veng, Advocate
General M. Jean Mischo highlighted the difference between the grant of an intellectual property
right and its exercise that could result in an abuse of a dominant position. In fact, the ECJ also
held that the refusal by an owner of registered designs to license the designs for reasonable
royalties could in some circumstances involve abuse of dominant position by the owner that was
liable to affect trade between member states and hence violate Article 82.44 The existence vs.
exercise doctrine was also endorsed by the ECJ in the Magill case.45 Thus, the ECJ decisions
clearly indicate the adoption of the existence vs. exercise doctrine while construing whether the
licensing (or refusal to license) of IPRs violates Article 82.
The ECJ has also adopted a ‘subject matter’ test for IPRs. In Deutsche Grammophon v.
Metro46 the ECJ held that derogations from the free movement of goods are permitted under
Article 30 only to the extent to which they are justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights,
which constitute the specific-matter of such IPRs. Consequently, in each case, the Court has to
determine the specific subject matter for each type of IPR.47 In Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, the
ECJ defined the specific subject matter for patents as “the guarantee that the patentee, to reward
the creative effort of the invention, has the exclusive right to use an invention with a view to
[*48*] manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for the first time,
either directly by grant of licenses to third parties, as well as to oppose infringements.”48 The

ECJ also characterized the specific subject matter of trademarks in Centrafarm v. Winthrop. The
Court held that the specific subject matter was the “guarantee that the owner of the trademark has
the exclusive right to use that trademark, for the purpose of putting products protected by
trademark into circulation for the first time, and is therefore intended to protect him against
competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of the trademark by selling
products illegally bearing that trademark.”49 With respect to copyrights, the ECJ has held the
specific subject matter as the exclusive right to both performance and reproduction.50 In the
Volvo case, the ECJ defined the subject matter of a model or design right as “to prevent third
parties from manufacturing and selling or importing, without its consent, products incorporating
the design.”
While the subject matter test was adopted in relation to Article 30 of the EC Treaty,
Advocate General Claus Gulmann tried to extend this test under Article 82 in the Magill case to
the issue of refusing to license copyrights per se.51 Gulmann disagreed with the reasoning of the
CFI that the refusal of the broadcasters to license their copyrights amounted to an abuse of
dominant position under Article 82.52 He said that since the exclusive right to reproduce a
copyrighted work forms part of the subject matter of copyright,53 the exclusive right to refuse
licenses is a corollary of the reproduction right, and ‘accordingly the right to refuse licenses
forms part of the specific subject matter of copyright.’54 He opined that only when the exercise
of an IPR is not necessary to fulfill its essential function that the interest of free competition must
prevail over the interest of the owner of the right to engage in that exercise.55 According to him,
the refusal to license in the Magill case was in order to fulfill the essential function of copyrights,
[*49*] and therefore not in violation of Article 82.56 Unfortunately, the ECJ declined to accept
his opinion and went with the CFI’s determination of the issue.57 The ECJ also seemed to

artificially distinguish between the core subject matter of an IPR and the ability to exercise the
right in derivative markets.58
By drawing a ‘metaphysical distinction’ between the existence of IPRs (including their
core subject matter) and exercise of IPRs (including licensing or refusal to license IPRs), the ECJ
has armed itself with the power to determine that certain acts relating to the exercise of IPRs
violate Article 82 of the EC Treaty.59 One author has remarked that, “Article 295 was effectively
rendered a nullity in relation to intellectual property rights.”60 While the ECJ has not completely
nullified the existence of Article 295, its judicially active attitude has nevertheless significantly
limited its scope.
III.

RESTRAINTS ON LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS BY THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 82
Undertakings that own IPRs may occupy a dominant position with respect to the IPR or

IPR products market because of the exclusive rights granted to the IPR owner with respect to
those rights. The nature of the IPR is relevant to determine dominant position. For instance, in
case of copyrights, the right is usually co-existent with the copyright work (book, movie,
software etc.) and therefore the existence of a right may be a key indicator of dominance in a
relevant product market.61 In case of a patent right, if the patent is only a minor element of the
product, it is less likely to indicate dominance.62 Similarly, a trademark may not have any direct
relationship to a particular product market.63 However, if the product is based on the patent, the
patent right could indicate a dominant position. If these IPRs are used in a manner that disrupts
free trade within the common market, or tilts the level playing field in favor of the undertaking,
there is a danger that the undertakings are in violation of Article 82. The Commission, CFI and
[*50*] ECJ have indirectly controlled the licensing (or refusal thereof) of IPRs by ensuring that
these acts do not violate Article 82 of the EC Treaty.64

Licensing of IPRs is only a subset of the activities that Article 82 aims at regulating,
therefore most of the community and competition law principles generally applicable to
restrictive practices under Article 82 have also been applied to issues concerning licensing of
IPRs. However, the Courts have attempted to give some deference to IPRs so as to not
unnecessarily restrain their exercise and render their existence meaningless, the deference seems
to be insubstantial, as the scope of Article 295 has been considerably narrowed.65
In order to understand the implications of Article 82 on licensing of IPRs, I have divided
this section into five parts:
(1)

Who do these provisions apply to?

(2)

What constitutes the relevant ‘market’?

(3)

When is an undertaking in a ‘dominant position’?

(4)

Under what circumstances is the undertaking said to abuse its dominant position?

(5)

What does ‘effect on trade between member states’ imply?
Under each of the sub-headings in this part, there is a brief description of general

competition law principles under Article 82 and thereafter a discussion of the impact they have
on licensing of IPRs. In the analysis, I have used non-IPR cases at times to explain the basic
competition principles and then explained how these principles could be and have been applied
in IPR cases. [*51*]

1.

Who Do These Provisions Apply To?

Article 82 applies to acts of ‘undertakings’.66 The term ‘undertaking’ is a broad concept,
that “covers a collection of resources to carry out economic activities.”67 The term ‘undertaking’
can therefore encompass a wide variety of legal entities including sole proprietary firms,

partnerships, companies, corporations, associations and governmental as well as nongovernmental organizations. Thus, any undertaking that owns IPRs and wants to trade in them
would be regulated by this provision.
The language in Articles 81 and 82 do not in any way assert jurisdiction over commerce
with ‘foreign nations’.68 While the right of a State to regulate acts carried out abroad is a matter
of public international law, it seems unclear as to what extent the EU (which is not a State) can
regulate acts of foreign undertakings when they affect trade between member states of the EU.69
Nevertheless, the Commission and the ECJ have interpreted competition law provisions to have
an extraterritorial effect under certain circumstances. The ECJ has implicitly extended the
meaning of undertakings to include foreign entities i.e. undertakings not established in the EU
territory. 70
The ECJ’s leading case on extraterritoriality is the Wood Pulp case71 decision of 1988. In
that case, the Commission sued non-EU producers of wood pulp for various restrictive practices
alleged to have restrained trade within the common market.72 The ECJ held that the jurisdiction
of EU law existed over firms outside the Community if they ‘implemented’ a price-fixing
agreement that reached outside the Community by selling to purchasers within the Community.73
The Court held that it was immaterial whether or not the defendants had any recourse to
subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents or branches within the Community, in order to make their
contacts with purchasers within the Community.74 Accordingly, the Community’s jurisdiction to
apply its competition rules to such conduct was covered by the territoriality principle, [*52*] as
universally recognized by public international law.75 A broad interpretation of this decision
suggests that any practice which produces an effect on competition within the Community may
be regarded as having been implemented in the Community and therefore falling within the

scope of the EC Treaty.76 This decision of the ECJ has raised much controversy and it could even
lead to conflicts of jurisdiction with non-EU countries.77
Non-EU IPR owners may be adversely affected by such extra-territorial application of
EU competition law. A foreign undertaking that wants to license its IPRs within the EU, directly
or through a subsidiary or agent, or refuses to license the IPRs would have to ensure that in doing
so it does not abuse its dominant position in the EU, if any, so as to distort competition within
the EU common market.
2.

What Constitutes the Relevant ‘Market’?

In order to determine the dominance of an undertaking and the abuse of this dominance,
it is essential to establish whether the market is in fact the ‘relevant market’.78 Defining the scope
of the ‘relevant market’ in which the undertaking conducts its trade is crucial as it determines
whether the undertaking is dominant or not.79 Defining the market helps the Commission and
Courts in identifying the competitors, thereby determining whether the acts of the ‘dominant
undertaking’ have any anti-competitive effects on those competitors. If the market is defined
broadly, an undertaking is less likely to be in a dominant position amongst all the competitors
than if the market is defined in sufficiently narrow terms, which can limit the field of legitimate
exploitation of IPRs. “A narrowly defined market can produce the result that possession of an
intellectual property right can coincide with or contribute to a position of dominance on a market
by reducing the possibilities of substitution. This then places the intellectual property owner into
a regulated category under Article 86 (now Article 82).”80 [*53*]
The first step is to determine the relevant product market81 upon which dominance is
measured, and its geographical scope.82 In order to guide the Commission and the Courts in
effective application of competition policies in the EU, the Commission issued the ‘Commission

Comment [ZM1]: They don't repeat
each other because the first one talks
about the relevant market, whereas the
second one talks about "scope" of the
relevant market.

Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law’83
(“Notice on Relevant Market”). The ECJ and CFI have also in several instances offered some
guiding principles on defining the ‘relevant market’. I have briefly discussed the meaning of
‘product market’ and ‘geographic market’ and their relevance in intellectual property licensing
cases.
(a)

Product Market

The term ‘product’ and ‘product market’ may not always refer to the same thing. While
determination of the product market commences with the product, it often exceeds the confines
of the product and includes a range of other goods.84
In the Notice on Relevant Market, the Commission defined a relevant product market as
one that “comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or
substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and their
intended use.”85 Further, in Tierce Ladbroke SA v. E.C. Commission86 involving an issue
concerning licensing of copyrights, the CFI, relying on prior precedents, expounded on the
meaning of ‘relevant product market.’ It held that:
For the purposes of Article 86 E.C., the relevant product or service market
includes products or services which are substitutable or sufficiently
interchangeable with the product or service in question, not only in terms of their
objective characteristics by virtue of which they are particularly suitable for
satisfying the constant needs of consumers, but also in terms of the conditions of
competition and/or structure of supply and demand of the market in question.87
Thus, substitutability or interchangeability88 of the products plays a significant role in
determining whether two or more products are part of the same product market. [*54*] However,
this gives substantial leeway to the Commission and the Courts to flex the meaning of ‘product
market’ based on the facts of each case. For instance, in Hugin v. Commission,89 the ECJ adopted
a narrow definition of product market and stated that a spare part of a product could constitute a

market that was separate from the main product itself. The ECJ’s main reason for finding Hugin
in a dominant position in a separate market for the spare parts was that there was special demand
for the spare parts.90 Similarly in Hilti v. European Commission,91 the ECJ accepted a relatively
narrow definition of product market as proposed by the Commission. In that case the
Commission claimed that each part of a particular package (consisting of patented gun and
cartridge strips, and un-patented nails) constituted a separate market, and there was not one
single market for the complex product. Consequently, Hilti, which was using its patented
cartridges to tie in nails, was found to abuse the dominant position in the market of a particular
part of the entire package.92
The finding of a narrow product market can thus tremendously restrict the ability of IPR
owners to exploit their rights93 and ultimately result in a lose-lose situation for the IPR owner.
For instance, in the Magill case, the CFI found two different product markets: the market for TV
listings themselves, and the derivative market for the TV listing magazines.94 The CFI and ECJ
held that the TV stations by force of circumstance had a de facto monopoly over the information
(listings) and therefore occupied a dominant position over the derivative market (of TV listing
magazines).95 As Steven Anderman puts it, the IPR owner could face ‘a form of double
jeopardy’.96
(b)

Geographic Market

The ECJ in United Brands v. Commission held:
The conditions for the application of Article 86 to an undertaking in a dominant
position presuppose the clear delimitation of the substantial part of the Common
[*55*] Market in which it may be able to engage in abuses which hinder effective
competition and this is an area where the objective conditions of competition
applying to the product in question must be the same for all traders.97

Further, paragraph 8 of the Notice on Relevant Market defines relevant geographic
market as follows:
The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services in which
the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogenous and which can be
distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are
appreciably different in those areas.
From the above two quotations it is clear that while determining the geographic market
the following factors must be considered:
(i)

the undertakings must be engaged in business in that area;

(ii)

the conditions of business must be homogenous for all competitors; and

(iii)

that area should be distinguishable from other areas where the competition conditions are
different.

beyond its judicial parameters.98 At this point in time, the Courts and Commission are walking a
very thin line between competition law and intellectual property protection, and more often than
not seem to step over on the side of competition law. Though the initial hostility towards IPRs as
being contrary to the fundamental principle of a single European market has decreased and the
Courts have given some deference to the existence and exercise of IPRs over the years, a more
objective and unambiguous standard is desired.
In the Ladbroke case, the CFI held that where the relevant product market does not
constitute an independent market, but is instead an ancillary market created as a result of and
operating according to the conditions of the main market, the geographical scope of the ancillary
market may be defined by reference to that of the main market.99 Therefore, as in the Magill case
that recognized a derivative market for copyrights, the geographical scope of the derivative
market can be determined from looking at the geographic market for copyrights. [*56*]

Further, according to Steven Anderman, when dealing with IPRs the geographic market
is often shaped to fit the area of intellectual property protection (i.e. the region in which the
exclusivity is conferred) without any further analysis of the interpretation of trade.100 This is
usually confined to one Member State or two, as it was in the Magill case.101 He has criticized
the act of the Commission in determining the relevant geographic market as less of an objective
economic assessment of homogenous market conditions and more an administrative device for
establishing findings of dominance and abuse.102

3.

When Is an Undertaking in a “Dominant Position”?
(a)

Meaning of “dominant position”

After having determined the relevant market in which the undertaking operates,
the next step is to determine whether the undertaking occupies a “dominant position” in that
market. In Michelin v. Commission, the ECJ confirmed that “Article 86 prohibits any abuse by
an undertaking of a dominant position . . . that is to say any abuse of a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to hinder the maintenance of effective
competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of consumers.”103 In Hoffman La
Roche, the ECJ also indicated that the definition of dominance does not apply solely to
monopolies:
Such a position does not preclude some competitors . . . but enables the
undertaking which profits by it, if not to determine, at least to have an [*57*]
appreciable influence on the conditions under which that competition will

develop, and to any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such conduct
does not operate to its detriment.104
Furthermore, a trader can only be in a dominant position on the market for a product if he
has succeeded in winning a large part of that market.105 The percentage of the market owned or
controlled necessary to constitute a dominant position is not static. Rather, it is dependent upon
a number of factors including the relevant market and the percentage of market share relative to
other competitors.106 The ECJ has found a dominant position in cases ranging from ninety
percent market share,107 to only a forty to forty-five percent market share.108 In addition, the
Commission has issued a report indicating that market shares of twenty to forty percent cannot
be ruled out as being dominant.109 Furthermore, it has also been suggested that even if the
market share is lower, a dominant position may be inferred if there are high barriers to entry that
guard the market share.110
(b)

Dominant position vis-à-vis IPRs

In the Magill case, the ECJ categorically held, “[S]o far as dominant position is
concerned, it is to be remembered at the outset that mere ownership of an intellectual property
right cannot confer such a position.”111 The Court was merely re-iterating the law that it had
propounded in its prior decisions.
In the Sirena112 and Deutsche Grammophon113 cases, the court held that for the proprietor
of an industrial property right to hold a dominant position, he must be in a position to prevent the
maintenance of effective competition over a considerable part of the relevant market. The court
must take into consideration the existence and position of any producers or distributors who may
be marketing similar goods or goods which may be substituted for them.114 [*58*]

In Hoffman v. Centrafarm, the court recognized the difference between an existence of an
IPR and its exercise which is limited to certain provisions in the EC Treaty. In that case the court
held that “to the extent to which the exercise of a trademark right is lawful in accordance with
the provisions of Article 36 of the Treaty, such exercise is not contrary to Article 86 of the Treaty
on the sole ground that it is an act of an undertaking occupying a dominant position on the
market if the trademark right has not been used as an instrument for the abuse of such a
position.”115 Thus, the court clearly indicates a difference between the existence of a dominant
position (which does not violate Article 82) and its abuse (which does).
Even in the Volvo case, the Advocate General opined:
The proprietorship of a registered design is not of itself sufficient automatically to
create a dominant position in every case. A fortiori, it cannot per se amount to an
abuse of such position…. As soon as the proprietor exercises the rights deriving
from his registered design and substitutable parts can no longer be produced, there
is no doubt that the manufacturer holds a dominant position in the relevant market
in the spare parts for which he registered the design.116
The Advocate General’s opinion could be interpreted as stating that both the existence of an IPR
and its exercise may not amount to the undertaking holding a dominant position, unless the
undertaking effectively prevents competitors from making ”substitutable” products available to
consumers. [*59*]

4.

Under What Circumstances Is the Undertaking Said to Abuse Its Position?

We have seen above that the mere fact that an undertaking enjoys a dominant position in
the relevant market does not amount to a violation of Article 82. In order for Article 82 to be
violated, the undertaking must “abuse” that position.
(a)

Meaning of “Abuse”

In Hoffman v. Commission, the ECJ enunciated on the concept of “abuse”. It held that
[T]he concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behavior of an
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a
market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the
degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods
different from those which condition normal competition in products or services
on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market
or the growth of that competition.117
An undertaking can be said to abuse its dominant position if it acts in a fashion that
encumbers the preservation or growth of competition in the relevant market. For example,
offering of discounts or financial advantages to customers that tends to prevent them from
obtaining the products from competitors could amount to an abuse of dominant position under
Article 82.118
(b)

Abuse in Relation to IPRs

The main rule enunciated by the court in the Volvo case, and further expounded in the
Magill case, is that the mere exercise of IPRs (i.e., license or refusal to license) does not amount
to an abuse of the dominant position. In the Volvo case, the UK Patents Court [*60*] made a

preliminary reference119 to the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on, inter alia, whether the refusal
to license the IPRs amounted to an abuse of the dominant position. The ECJ decided as follows:
[T]he exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor of a registered design in
respect of car body panels may be prohibited by Article 86 [now Article 82] if it
involves, on the part of an undertaking holding a dominant position, certain
abusive conduct such as the arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent
repairers, the fixing of prices for spare parts at unfair level, or decision no longer
to produce spare parts for a particular model even though many cars of that model
are still in circulation, provided that such conduct is liable to affect trade between
member states.120
In the Magill case, the ECJ expanded on Volvo and held that it is the normal exercise of
an IPR owner’s right to freely determine the conditions under which he markets his product,121
and a refusal to grant a license, even if it is the act of an undertaking holding a dominant
position, cannot in itself constitute abuse of a dominant position.122 However, the exercise of an
exclusive right by the proprietor of an intellectual property right may in “exceptional
circumstances” involve abusive conduct.123 The Magill court laid down the following as
“exceptional circumstances”: 124
(i)

No actual or potential substitute for a particular product for which there was specific,
constant, and regular potential demand on the part of the consumers: Prevention of the
appearance of a new product on the market because of the reliance on intellectual
property rights, which the appellants did not offer and for which there was potential
consumer demand;

(ii)

No justification for the refusal to license / supply; [*61*]

(iii)

Reservation of a secondary market by excluding all competition on that market by
denying basic raw material indispensable for the product.
(c)

Deciphering the Restraints of the “Exceptional Circumstances” Test in
Magill

The Magill court found all three circumstances present. Magill wanted to publish a
comprehensive weekly television guide, but was prevented from doing so by the three television
stations that owned the copyright in their program information (i.e., the raw material). There
was no actual or potential substitute for a weekly television guide despite constant consumer
demand. In that respect, by refusing to license the copyright in the raw material, the television
stations had prevented the emergence of a new product. Furthermore, the court held that there
was no business justification for the refusal, although the ECJ did not discuss this finding
thoroughly.125 Lastly, the court held that the television stations had reserved the monopoly in the
secondary market of weekly television guides by excluding all competition.
Cumulative application of the circumstances: After doing a post-mortem analysis of the
Magill decision, it is evident that the court did not specify whether all three exceptional
circumstances must be present to find an abuse of dominant position. One author, Rosa Greaves,
has suggested that the minimum requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to claim that an
IPR owner has abused its dominant position are that the owner must be the sole source of the raw
material and that access to the material is indispensable for the other party.126 This implies that
only the third condition is necessary to find abuse of the dominant position. However, on the
other hand, two authors, Hedvig Schmidt127 and Valentine Korah,128 have remarked that all three
conditions must be present together to find an abuse.
The CFI distinguished the Magill case while making its decision in the Ladbroke case.
The court held that the applicant, Ladbroke, was not prevented from entering into a new [*62*]
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market because, not only was it present in the market, but it occupied a large share.129
Furthermore, according to the court, the IPR owners had a reasonable justification for refusing to
license the copyrights because they were not present on the Belgian market, therefore, the refusal
did not amount to an abusive exploitation of the rights in the Belgian market.130 As mentioned
earlier, the court held that the refusal to license would fall under Article 82 if it concerned an
article that was essential or if there was no real or potential substitute, or if a new product was
being prevented despite consumer demand.131 Even though the CFI held that the Magill decision
was not relevant to the case,132 it seemed to have analyzed the circumstances cumulatively.133
In Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint,134 the ECJ interpreted Magill to mean that all the
exceptional circumstances must be present to find an abuse under Article 82.135 In that case,
Mediaprint was a publisher of two daily newspapers and operated the only national home
delivery service in Austria. Bronner claimed that Mediaprint held a dominant position in relation
to that service and should be required to deliver Bronner’s papers too. The court disagreed with
Bronner’s arguments. It held as follows:
[F]or the Magill judgment to be effectively relied upon in order to plead the
existence of an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty . . . not only
that the refusal of the service comprised in home delivery be likely to eliminate all
competition in the daily newspaper market on the part of the person requesting the
service and that such refusal be incapable of being objectively justified, but also
that the service in itself be indispensable to carrying on that person’s business, in
as much as there is no actual or potential substitute in existence for that home
delivery service.136

The ECJ ruled that there were other ways of delivering newspapers even if they were less
satisfactory or not economically viable for Bronner.137 Furthermore, there [*63*] were no
technical, legal, or economic obstacles that appeared to make it unreasonably difficult for a
publisher to set up a second national delivery service.138
However, in NDC v. IMS,139 the CFI noted that the Commission, in its interim decision,
seemed to take a non-cumulative interpretation of the conditions regarded as constituting
“exceptional circumstances” in Magill.140 The CFI observed that the Commission asserted that
the exercise of a copyright may amount to an abuse even in the absence of abusive additional
conduct when, inter alia, it prevents the appearance off a new product. The CFI remarked that
although the Commission’s interpretation “may be correct,” based on prior cases is reasonable
grounds to conclude that the “exceptional circumstances” envisaged in Magill are concurrent.141
While the ECJ upheld the CFI’s decision to suspend the Commission’s decision, it did not
specifically comment on the CFI’s determination on the application of “exceptional
circumstances.” It would be useful to keep track of the final decision of the Commission in this
case to understand how the Commission interprets and implements the Magill “exceptional
circumstances” test in its final decision.
Undefined scope of the circumstances: Furthermore, given the backdrop of Magill, and
the manner in which later courts have dealt with the refusal to license IPRs, it is still not
completely clear as to when an IPR owner’s refusal to license the IPRs would violate
competition law. For example, would a patent holder’s refusal to license the patent to a third
party that wants to manufacture a new (competing) product violate Article 82?

What

circumstances would qualify as a justification for refusal to supply or license IPRs? Many
copyright holders fear that EC competition laws will be used force them to license billions of

[*64*] dollars worth of technology or proprietary information in critically competitive areas.142
An IPR owner, by virtue of his exclusive rights, has the authority to enjoin a person from
exploiting his IPRs, or, for that matter, refuse to license the IPRs to a third person. However, if
such a refusal by itself were said to violate competition law, it would negate the rights of an IPR
owner and allow competitors to free ride on the goodwill and investment of the IPR owner.143
Another rather unfortunate consequence of Magill seems to be that the market demand
for a new product would limit the rights of an IPR owner. In Magill, the customers already had
access to the different television listings, but in different places. The only difference that Magill
sought to make was to combine all the listings into one television guide. The court seemed to
have favored the convenience sought by the customers in accessing the listings from one place
over the significant interests of the IPR owners.144 While it is true that market demand drives
innovation and production of new products, it could also stifle innovation if undertakings that
have invested substantial time, effort, and money are forced to license their rights in creative
works to “free-riders” in order to satiate the market demand. As stated by Advocate General
Gulmann, the interests of the consumer should not be used to justify interference in the specific
subject matter of a copyright.145
In order to balance the interests of the author/inventor with those of the public (including
competitors and consumers), the TRIPS agreement allows member states to create exceptions
and limitations to the rights of IPR owners.146 Member states may, in the interest of the public,
allow compulsory licensing of IPRs in some instances. Given that these restrictions already exist
on IPR owners, imposing further restrictions on the exclusive rights of IPR owners under the
garb of competition law seems unjustified.147 [*65*]

Furthermore, “no justification for refusal to supply/license IPRs” is only one of the three
factors in the “exceptional circumstances” test. However, the other two factors, consumer
demand for new product due to lack of substitutes and the IPR constituting raw material for
another product, seem to qualify, at least to some extent, the “no justification” factor. This factor
says that if there exists consumer demand for a new product, and if the IPR is the raw material
required for the new product, a refusal to license the IPR would not be justified. It is therefore
only fair to the IPR owner that all three circumstances exist together in order to find an abuse of
dominant position. Determining abuse based on the existence of only one of the three factors
may be detrimental to the interests of IPR owners and against the concept of intellectual property
protection.
It is necessary that the ECJ properly explain the scope and application of the “exceptional
circumstances” test in relation to intellectual property licensing issues to ensure more stability.
One author has suggested that the best way to summarize the Magill judgment could be to say
that the refusal to license IPRs is contrary to Art. 82 if it is “combined with or is the means of
committing abusive conduct that has effects other than those which would be caused; in the
market primarily protected by the intellectual property right, by the mere refusal itself.”148
However, this seems to be an ambiguous and difficult standard to determine because the
Commission or court would first have to ascertain the effect that a mere refusal to license would
have on the market, followed by the effect that the refusal coupled with the “abusive conduct”
has. There is definitely a need for a more objective approach to create legal certainty on this
issue. [*66*]
(d)

Other Forms of Abuse

Article 82 also lists four circumstances in which an IPR owner’s conduct could constitute
an abuse of his dominant position.149 By imposing unfair trading conditions; discriminating
between trading parties; mandating tie-in arrangements; or limiting production, markets, or
technical development to the prejudice of consumers, an IPR owner could also adversely affect
the competition in the market. For instance, in one case,150 the ECJ held that a national copyright
management society had abused its dominant position in a substantial part of the common market
by imposing unfair trading conditions where the royalties which it charged to discotheques were,
without objective justification, appreciably higher than those charged in other member states, the
rates being compared on a consistent basis.151
5.

What does “effect on trade between Member States” signify?
Another important condition that needs to be satisfied is that the abuse of the

dominant position resulting from the licensing or refusal to license IPRs must have an effect on
trade between member states. If this condition is not satisfied, then, even if an undertaking is
found to abuse its dominant position, it will not amount to a violation of Article 82. The
condition that trade between member states must be affected is a question of law and, as such,
subject to review by the ECJ.152In Michelin v. Commission, the ECJ concluded:
[W]hen the holder of a dominant position obstructs access to the market by
competitors it makes no difference whether such conduct is confined to a single
Member State so long as it is capable of affecting patterns of trade and
competition on the Common Market . . . It must also be remembered that Article
86 does not require it to be proved that the abusive conduct has in fact appreciably
affected trade between Member-States but that is capable of having that effect.153
[*67*]

The court in the Magill case also upheld the notion that the alleged abusive conduct can
be anticompetitive if it has the potential of effecting trade between member states.154 In that case,
the ECJ upheld the CFI’s finding that the applicant had excluded all potential competitors on the
geographical market consisting of one member state, Ireland, and part of another member state,
Northern Ireland, and had thus modified the structure of competition on that market, thereby
affecting potential commercial exchanges between Ireland and the UK. The ECJ held that “from
this the CFI drew the proper conclusion that the condition that trade between member states must
be affected had been satisfied.”155
IV.

TREATING IPRS AS ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
In some of their decisions, discussed hereinafter, the Commission and courts have

implicitly treated IPRs as essential facilities and thereby diminished the exclusivity provided to
an IPR owner. EU law does not provide a legal definition for the essential facilities doctrine.156
The essential facilities doctrine refers to a situation in which a dominant undertaking owns or
controls a facility that is indispensable to its competitors and it refuses to grant its competitors
access to such a facility.157 The burden of proof is on the plaintiff who wants to invoke the
doctrine to show that the access to the facility is vital to compete in the market with the
undertaking that owns or controls the essential facility.158 The ECJ seems to have applied the
essential facilities doctrine under Article 82 in cases where the defendant’s conduct is
exclusionary, namely, in cases where the refusal to grant access to facilities harms
competition.159 Although the ECJ has yet to make an explicit reference to the essential facilities
doctrine in Article 82 cases, it has implicitly used the doctrine in a number of cases.160
The Magill decision by the ECJ in 1995 spawned a debate as to whether a refusal to
license IPRs could implicate the essential facilities doctrine. As discussed above, the ECJ held

[*68*] that under “exceptional circumstances,” the refusal by an undertaking to license its IPRs
to third parties could violate Article 82. This decision generated a lot of anxiety amongst IPR
owners in the pharmaceutical and software industries as the owners were unsure whether they
would be forced to license their IPRs to third parties and competitors.161 Although ECJ has not
explicitly referred to IPRs as “essential facilities,” in this case it is unclear whether it intended to
do so.162
The scope of the Magill decision has been restricted by the CFI in the Ladbroke case163
In that case an undertaking holding the exclusive rights (i.e., copyrights) to market televised
pictures and audio commentaries on French horse races refused to license the copyright to
retransmit these audiovisuals to a Belgian betting agency. The CFI distinguished the case from
Magill and held that the refusal to supply could not fall within the prohibition laid down by
Article 82 unless it concerned a product or service that was essential for the exercise of the
activity. The court held that in that particular case the granting of a license to retransmit the
horse races was not essential or indispensable to the activities of the betting agency as the bets
were already placed before the races were transmitted.
The decisions in Magill and Ladbroke indicate that whether a refusal to license an IPR
violates Article 82 depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, as indicated
above, they do not suggest what can be accepted as a reasonable justification for refusing to
grant a license for an IPR.164 They could probably also be interpreted to indicate that if the
refusal to license the IPR is essential to the exercise of an activity, it may violate Article 82. In
Magill, the court found that the refusal to license the copyright in the information prevented the
publisher from publishing a comprehensive television guide, whereas in Ladbroke, the court
found that the refusal to license the copyright in the audiovisual works was not essential to the

[*69*] betting activity. It could thus be implied that while the court did not specifically rely on
the essential facilities doctrine in either of the cases, the doctrine did have some bearing on the
court’s decision-making process in the two cases.
In a later case concerning the grant of exclusive broadcasting rights for football games,
the Commission threatened to impose fines on the parties if they refused to grant the football
broadcasting rights to other competitors.165 It has been remarked that the outcome of this case
probably indicates that the Commission may rely on the essential facilities doctrine in licensing
cases, particularly those relating to broadcasting rights.166
The Commission also seemed to apply the essential facilities doctrine in NDC v. IMS.167
In that case, IMS owned the copyright in a brick-system that it had developed to gather
information on sales and prescription of pharmaceutical products in Germany and it provided
this data to pharmaceutical companies. NDC and AsyX were new entrants in this market and
they used the brick-system until they were successfully sued by IMS for copyright infringement.
NDC filed an action with the Commission against IMS for violation of Article 82. In its interim
decision, the Commission required IMS to grant a license to NDC until it was notified of the
Commission’s final decision. The Commission based its decision, inter alia, on the basis that the
brick-system constituted a de facto industry standard and the refusal of access to the bricksystem was likely to eliminate all competition in the relevant market.168 The President of the
CFI, ex parte, suspended the interim decision of the Commission until the order terminating the
proceedings for interim relief was made.169 NDC appealed this decision of the President. The
ECJ170 upheld the first decision of the CFI to suspend the Commission’s contested order until the
main action was reviewed. The CFI’s decision suggests a more positive attitude towards the
protection of IPRs. While balancing the interests of IMS and NDC, the court states that the fact

[*70*] that IMS “invoked and sought to enforce its copyright . . . for economic reasons does not
lessen its entitlement to rely on the exclusive right granted by national law for the very purpose
of regarding innovation.”171 The final decision of the Commission in this case would definitely
shed more light on whether it feels that IPRs can be treated as essential facilities.
Treating IPRs as “essential facilities” could dilute their very existence and would be
potentially damaging to the viability of IPRs.172 Firstly, it would stifle creativity, not only
amongst the authors and inventors, but also amongst competitors.

Competitors would be

disinterested in developing any competing IPRs, but would rather use the existing IPRs under the
guise of essential facilities. Ultimately, the consumer will bear the brunt of this phenomenon as
his/her choice or products would be confined to existing products. Secondly, creators and
inventors would also be discouraged from making innovations in existing IPRs due to the fear
that competitors would appropriate their investment in research and development without any
adequate quid pro quo. Lastly, treating IPRs as essential facilities would invite regulatory
intervention with respect to licensing of IPRs and deprive the IPR owners of their prerogative to
choose as to when and how they wish to exploit their IPRs.

V.

CONCLUSION
While intellectual property protection offers authors and inventors incentives to create by

rewarding their intellectual efforts, if they are given unrestrained protection, IPR owners would
be more prone to misusing and manipulating their rights and thereby harming consumer and
competitor interests. This tension between IPRs and competition law is reflected in TRIPS.
Though TRIPS is a fundamental global instrument that concerns the international protection of
IPRs so as to prevent any barriers in global trade, it also explicitly recognizes that some licensing

[*71*] practices or conditions pertaining to IPRs may restrain competition and as a result have
adverse effects on trade.173 In fact, TRIPS permits its members to adopt appropriate measures to
prevent or control any such licensing practices or conditions that may constitute an abuse of IPRs
in certain instances and therefore have an unfavorable impact on competition in the relevant
market.174 Nevertheless, TRIPS clearly articulates that the measures taken to prevent anticompetitive practices must not be overly intrusive i.e. they should be consistent with other
provisions of TRIPS that aim at protecting IPRs.175 This seems to indicate that both intellectual
property and competition law interests must be balanced and neither one of them should trump
over the other. However, the EU has nonetheless urged that the exercise of IPRs should be fully
subject to competition laws.176
The ECJ has been at the forefront of the European integration movement and has
deepened and expanded the original Community principles to maintain the effectiveness of EC
law.177 It is unquestionable that the courts and Commission178 view competition law as a means
of regulating the exploitation of IPRs (which is a matter that is supposed to be in the exclusive
domain of member states) in the EU so as prevent the partitioning of the common market. The
use of the exercise/existence doctrine has significantly narrowed the reach of Article 295.
Furthermore, the Magill, Ladbroke, and IMS Health cases also suggest an indirect endorsement
of the essential facilities doctrine in relation to IPRs. While the ECJ has not explicitly referred to
the essential facilities doctrine in a case involving the abuse of dominant position by an IPR
owner under Article 82, the application of this doctrine to IPRs, as suggested above, could
undermine the very existence of IPRs.
The ECJ has often been criticized as being activist and interpreting treaty provisions
beyond its judicial parameters.179 At this point in time, the courts and Commission are walking a

[*72*] very thin line between competition law and intellectual property protection, and more
often than not seem to step over on the side of competition law. Though the initial hostility
towards IPRs as being contrary to the fundamental principle of a single European market has
decreased and the courts have given some deference to the existence and exercise of IPRs over
the years, a more objective and unambiguous standard is desired.
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For the purpose of this paper, the term “IPR” shall include copyright and related rights,
trademarks, service marks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs
(topographies) of integrated circuits, undisclosed information, know-how, trade secrets, plant
breeder’s rights, and other similar rights granted under national laws. The term ‘industrial
property’ under Article 30 of the EC Treaty is a subset of IPRs.
3

Some IPRs tend to be more monopolistic than others. For example, patent rights granted on
inventions are more restrictive in nature as compared to trademarks. Patents give the patent
owner a limited, but strong monopoly to use, make, sell, import or export the invention on which
the owner possesses a patent right. On the other hand, trademarks provide a business with the
exclusive rights to use the mark on certain types of goods and/or services, leaving room, in most
cases, for third parties to use the identical or similar trademark on different categories of goods
and/or services.

4

It is a right ‘to stop others doing certain things – rights in other words to stop pirates,
counterfeiters, imitators and even in some cases third parties who have independently reached
the same ideas, from exploiting them without the license of the rightowner.’ See W.R. Cornish,
Intellectual Property, 5-6 (3d ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1996), as quoted in Hedvig K.S. Schmidt,
Article 82’s ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ that Restrict Intellectual Property Rights, 23(5) Eur.
Competition L. Rev. 210, 210 (2002) (hereafter “Schmidt”).
5

Sergio Baches Opi, The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property
Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still
Sacrosanct?, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 409, 412 (2001) (hereafter “Opi”).

6

Preamble, ¶1, TRIPS: “Members… Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to [*73*]
international trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection
of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade…Hereby agree as
follows…”
7

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994, Annex 1C,
Agreement Establishing the WTO concluded on April 15, 1994 in Marrakesh, and enforced on
January 1, 1995. The European Union and its member states are members of the WTO and
signatories to TRIPS.

8

See, Communication from the European Community and Its Member States (dated September
15, 1998) to the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy at the
WTO: “On the relationship between trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights and
competition policy, and between investment and competition policy” September 25, 1998 (983720), p. 1 (hereafter “EU Communication”): “The relationship between intellectual property
rights and competition including competition policy has been at the centre of policy debates for
many years. The trade dimension of this discussion was at the heart of the negotiations in the
Uruguay Round that led to the conclusion of the Agreement on the trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights.”
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Nicholas Green, Intellectual Property and the Abuse of Dominant Position under European
Union Law: Existence, Exercise and the Evaporation Rights, 20 Brook. J. Int’l L. 141, 141
(1993) (hereafter “Green”) (commenting that “the interface between intellectual property rights
and competition law has proven a fertile source of debate and litigation under the Treaty of
Rome”).
10

The Treaty of Maastricht gave birth to the ‘European Union’ (EU) in 1993. However, the
movement towards an integrated market in Europe had begun in the 1950s. The EU is ‘founded’
on the European Communities. The term ‘European Community’ was the term used, up to the
end of 1993, to denote a political entity composed of three Communities: the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the
European Economic Community (EEC). After the EU was created, the EEC has been redesignated as the European Community (EC), whereas the ECSC and the Euratom retain their
independent identities. See, Jo Shaw, Law of the European Union, 4-7 (3d ed., Palgraves 2000).
11

Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, 394 (1st ed., Oxford University
Press 1999) (hereafter “Arnull”).
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(Cases 56 & 58/64) Establissements Consten SA and Grundig-verkaufs GmbH v. Commission,
1 C.M.L.R. 418, 471 (1966) (hereafter “Consten case”): “ … [A]n agreement between producer
and distributor which might tend to restore the national divisions in trade between memberStates could be such as to thwart the most basic objects of the Community. The Treaty, whose
preamble and the text aim at suppressing the barriers between States and which in several
provisions gives evidence of a stern attitude with regard to their reappearance, could not allow
undertakings to restore such barriers.”
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Article 2 of the EC Treaty mandates that in order to establish a common market, the [*74*]
Community shall implement common policies or activities specified in Articles 3 and 4 of the
Treaty. Article 3(1)(g) of the EC Treaty explicitly reads as follows: “For the purposes set out in
Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in
accordance with the timetable set out therein: … (g) a system ensuring that competition in the
internal market is not distorted…” Articles 81-89 (ex Articles 85-94) of the EC Treaty contain
rules on EU competition law.
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Eric F. Hinton, European Community Competition Law, Subsidiarity, and the National Courts,
11 BYU J. Pub. L. 301 (1997) (hereafter “Hinton”).
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Dr. John Temple Lang, Competition Law and Regulation Law From An EC Perspective, 23
Fordham Int’l L.J. 116, 116 (2000).
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Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, Centrafarm and Others (1968) C.M.L.R. 47, 59. IPR owners
could be adversely affected by the application of Article 82 to licensing practices. For instance, if
an IPR owner refuses to license its patent rights to others when there is no substitute for the
patented product despite consumer demand, and when there is no justification for the refusal, it
could be said to be abusing its dominant position in relation to the patent right. The ECJ, CFI and
Commission have used this provision to curtail the IPR owner exclusive right to license its IPRs.
A detailed discussion follows in Part III of this paper.
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See (Case C-350/92) Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union (1996) F.S.R. 73
(hereafter “Patent Protection case”).
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However, the EU institutions have extensively utilized the provisions related to approximation
of EU law under Articles 3(h) and 94 of the EC Treaty to formulate proposals and pass
regulations and directives to harmonize intellectual property laws within the EU. See:
Trademarks: Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of
the member states relating to Trade Marks; Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of
20 December 1993 on the Community Trademark. Copyright and Related Rights: Council
Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programmes; Council
Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain
rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property; Council Directive 93/83/EEC of
27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and related rights
of copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission; Council Directive
93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and certain
related rights; Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
1996 on the legal protection of databases; European Parliament and Council Directive 98/84/EC
of 20 November 1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional
access; Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September
2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art; European
Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society; Patents: Commission proposal,
of 1 August 2000, for a Regulation of the Council on the Community patent [COM(2000) 412
final - Official Journal C 337 E, 28.11.2000]; Designs: European Parliament and Council

Directive 98/71/EC of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of design; Semiconductors: [*75*]
Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986 on the legal protection of topographies of
semiconductor products; see generally Graeme Dinwoodie, William O. Hennessey, Shira
Perlmutter, International Intellectual Property Law and Policy (Lexis Nexis Publishing 2001)
(commenting that the harmonisation has tended to be partial or fragmentary in nature).
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George Kuoumantos, Reflections on the Concept of Intellectual Property, Intellectual Property
and Information Law: Essays in Honor of Herman Cohen Jehorem, 39-45 (1998).
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This paper deals with the impact of competition law on trade in IPRs per se i.e. licensing of
IPRs. In the case of trade in IPR products, Article 30 of the EC Treaty would also applicable
which permits member states to make prohibitions or restrictions (quantitative or qualitative) for
the protection of industrial and commercial property provided the prohibitions or restrictions do
not constitute an arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between member
states.
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Schmidt, supra n. 4, at 210.
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Ibid.
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Under the ‘Council Regulation No 17 (EEC): First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and
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